Lukasiewicz' infinite-valued logic L has been used by a number of authors to study reasoning with vague, "fuzzy", or uncertain statements ([5], [2] , [11] , [12] ). Scott and, more recently, Katz have also argued that L is appropriate for the logic of degrees of error or degrees of approximation to the truth ([6], p. 421 and [4], p. 773). The aim of this note is to show that L is not appropriate for this purpose, regardless of its possible application to vagueness, and to derive a few facts about alternative systems which are appropriate, or more nearly so.
Let us apply the accuracy property to a multivalued logic designed to measure error. For simplicity, we consider the language whose only predicate is '=', with constants '/*', V, H\ etc., and variables 'x\ y, V, etc. The symbols V, '&', 'D','-', '(x)\ and *(3Λ:)', stand for disjunction, conjunction, material conditional, negation, universal and existential quantification, respectively. A structure M for this language consists of a nonempty universe U, denotations for the terms V, V, 6 t\ etc., and a function F: U x £/-> [0,1] giving a metric on U with values in the interval [0, 1] . We also use a denotation function d(u,σ) defined as follows: let the function σ be any assignment of values in U to each variable *x\ y, etc. Then d(u,σ) is the denotation of u if u is a constant, or the value assigned to u by σ if u is a variable. We are clearly assuming here that the value 0 represents the truth, and that values in (0,1] represent various degrees of error or inaccuracy, with 1 the maximum possible error. We let \p\ be the degree of error assigned by Fto the statement p. If we interchange 0 with 1 in the usual Lukasiewicz continuumvalued system, we get definition clauses equivalent to those adopted by Katz for ||/?||(σ), which is \p\ considered as a function of the sequence σ:
where the supremum is taken over those σ' which agree with σ except possibly on the assignment to V.
where the infinum is taken over all σ' which agree with σ except possibly on the value assigned to *x\ Where σ is understood, we can omit the * (σ)' in ' || |(σ)', but we also officially define ||/?|| =sup||ι|(σ), It follows from this proposition that (2) is violated in several ways by the Lukasiewicz clauses in (1) . In (a), p v ~ p is obviously true under the usual interpretation of the connectives since it is a tautology. 2 If \p\ = \, however, then ||/7 v ~p\ = \, which seems a long way from the truth on a scale of 0 to 1. In (b), p and q must both be false since their || || values are positive (using (2)), so that/7 D q must be true although its || || value is positive. If \p\ = |, for example, and \q\ = f, then \p D q\\ = |, althoughp D q is true.
A little more analysis of these two cases shows that the '-' and '!)' clauses can be modified to avoid violating the accuracy principle (2). These modifications can be carried out and still retain the convenient feature that L shares with most multivalued logics, namely truth-functionality. Using (2) and truth-functionality as joint requirements, we give a heuristic "derivation" of an alternative multivalued system S, beginning with negation: If | | /71| > 0, then p must be false, so ~p will be true, and || ~/7|| = 0. If ||/?|| = 0, however, p could conceivably be false, since (2) only requires that true/7 have ||/71 = 0, not that falsep must have \p\ different from zero. It is convenient to suppose this, however, and by doing so, we would only be requiring of all p what the metric F already guarantees for equations. This supposition does not, however, determine a unique value for || ~p\ when \p\ = 0. || ~p\\ must have some positive value, and it is convenient to choose || ~p\\ = 1. Thus we obtain the following revised definition for || ~ p \\:
For the revised definition of \\p D q\\, condition (2) requires a value of 0 whenever \\p\\ > 0, sincep D q must be true in that case. For \\p\\ =0, \\p D q\\ must be a function of \\q\\ if D is to be truth-functional. It also seems clear that in this case, \\p D q\\ should be an increasing function of ||<7||. That is, if p is true and q is false, then \\p D q\\ should be farther from the truth (i.e., from 0) the "more false" q is. Since the simplest increasing function of ||^|| is \\q\\ itself, we arrive at the following clause for D:
For comparison with other multivalued systems, it is convenient to let x stand for any element of [0,1] other than the end points 0 and 1, and "compress" the continuum-valued function || || into a three-valued logic given by the following tables: The multivalued system 5 based on these tables clearly satisfies (2), but has an important drawback, that logically equivalent statements need not have the same S-values. For example, if \\p\\ = x, 0 < x < 1, then || ~p\\ = 0, and || -p\\ = 1, so ||p|| Φ I -p\. This unhappy property is not, however, a result of some mistake in the formulation of 5, as the following proposition shows: The consequences of this proposition are sweeping. No logic of accuracy worthy of the name is possible if there are not at least three degrees of accuracy. At least two are necessary merely to distinguish between true and false statements, and at least three if any distinctions among degrees of falsity are to be made. The accuracy principle is unavoidable as well, since without it some true statement will be counted as inaccurate. It follows from Proposition 2 either that the logic of approximate truth is not truth-functional, and a fortiori, not Lukasiewicz logic, or that some logically equivalent statements are assigned different degrees of inaccuracy. This suggests that one should look into nontruth-functional alternatives. Hilpinen ([3] ), for example, proposes a logic based on Brouwerian modal logic. I will discuss this alternative further in a future paper, but a few important points remain to explore about S.
Proposition 2
Although there is very little in the literature on systems based on the truth tables (5), Slupecki ([7] ) investigated a related system based on D and ~ as in the tables (5), plus a third unary operation R which has the table:
Slupecki gives an axiomatization and completeness proof for this system, but his only designated value is 0, so he only considers how truth, and not approximate truth, is preserved by inferences. This is a critical limitation, however, because a major reason for studying approximate truth is to discover which inferences from nearly true statements have nearly true conclusions. Some familiar valid arguments can permit arbitrarily large errors in conclusions, even for small errors in the premises. For example, consider the modus ponens argument:
If |/71| = .01 or any other positive distance from the truth -no matter how small-then p D q is true, so the accuracy principle (2) implies \p D q\\ =0. Thus both premises can be as close to the truth as we like, without imposing any conditions on the size of ||<gr||. Note that this discontinuity in modus ponens is not just a property of the system S, but follows directly from (2) . Additional conditions can be obtained to guarantee that sufficiently small errors in the premises will yield small errors in the conclusion-i.e., a kind of continuity for arguments -but the above example shows that modus ponens will not, in general, be continuous.
It is often possible to compensate for inaccuracy in one premise of a valid argument by strengthening another premise. For example, if we assume that the second premise of (6) is precisely true, then we will have \\q\\ < a for the conclusion q if \\p D q\\ < a, i.e., if the error in the first premise is at most α. On the other hand, if conditions stronger than truth are imposed on the first premise, the error in the conclusion will be at most a if the error in the second premise is at most α. (Sufficient conditions for continuity of arguments like modus ponens were announced in [9] .) Katz in [4] and Aronson, et al., in [1] investigate inferences which preserve small or large truth values within their respective Lukasiewicz-based systems, but if the argument of this paper is correct, that work will not apply to the reservation of accuracy without substantial modifications. There remain the two possibilities of the system S and of non-truthfunctional logics to be investigated further. NOTES 1. For further discussion of this criterion, see [3] and [10] .
2. Here, as throughout this paper, I attempt to develop a notion of approximate truth suited to a classical interpretation of the logical connectives. There are, of course, interpretations of the propositional calculus in which pv ~p need not be true, but this will not happen in the classical interpretation of V, which is the subject of this paper.
